late in the historic career of former South African President Nelson Mandela, new york times I was asked to leave my assigned area of West and Central Africa and stay temporarily in Johannesburg and report from there until another reporter arrived to undertake a new assignment covering South Africa.
This was in 1995. It was a time when the aged Mandela had already visibly stalled, and was already vying for a future in which people with his prestige and unassailable moral standing would no longer run the country. While my editors were positive about the way Mandela ruled after leading negotiations to end apartheid, some of my predecessors Times One of them urged me to keep an eye out for what he called a ‘real African’ revival.
That formula has grated on me. I understood that to mean that South Africa was an outlier on that continent — building great wealth, albeit only some, based on statutory and violent racism. A country that was devastated — and understood to mean there would be a different Africa where gross injustice and poverty were not just the norm, but a more fixed, even permanent feature of life. The information I received was meant to warn that South Africa’s seemingly exceptionalism could fade away and become a ‘normal’ African country after the Mandela incident.
late in the historic career of former South African President Nelson Mandela, new york times I was asked to leave my assigned area of West and Central Africa and stay temporarily in Johannesburg and report from there until another reporter arrived to undertake a new assignment covering South Africa.
This was in 1995. It was a time when the aged Mandela had already visibly stalled, and was already vying for a future in which people with his prestige and unassailable moral standing would no longer run the country. While my editors were positive about the way Mandela ruled after leading negotiations to end apartheid, some of my predecessors Times One of them urged me to keep an eye out for what he called a ‘real African’ revival.
That formula has grated on me. I understood that to mean that South Africa was an outlier on that continent — building great wealth, albeit only some, based on statutory and violent racism. A country that was devastated — and understood to mean there would be a different Africa where gross injustice and poverty were not just the norm, but a more fixed, even permanent feature of life. The information I received was meant to warn that South Africa’s seemingly exceptionalism could fade away and become a ‘normal’ African country after the Mandela incident.
This is not a column about South Africa’s complex and tragic racial history, nor is it a post-apartheid as well as a democracy governed by the African National Congress, a political party that until recently was strongly dominated. Nor is it a column about unique political life. These are topics galore for other occasions. Rather, it examines the paths South Africa did not take during the Mandela era and its immediate aftermath, and the profound economic and geopolitical consequences that resulted from South Africa’s choices during that era.
South Africa today faces two growing challenges. One is a long-term and glaring issue, and the other is a more recent vintage and in its early stages. The first is the deep socio-economic inequality that has been baked into apartheid’s formula since its inception, and has not been alleviated anywhere to the degree expected since the legal separation of races ended. . Second, stagnating economic growth masks this inequality, a crisis that threatens the future of the country.
South Africa suffered a decade of very slow growth before the COVID-19 pandemic brought about a sharp and temporary economic decline. For example, in 2019 its expansion was only 0.1%.be careful twitter, using data consistent with World Bank figures, South Africa’s GDP was ten times that of Kenya in 2010. Today, just 10 years later, it’s only three times her size, and “maybe another African country in 20 years.”
Over the past decade or so, South Africa’s unemployment rate has risen to shocking levels. This is like other common symptoms of a systemic crisis that some say suggest a failed state. The tragic inability of the country’s power system to keep up with demand. And recently, the rate of violent crime has skyrocketed.
What does this have to do with geopolitics and South Africa’s choices in the 1990s? Regarding the country’s commitment to the rest of the African continent, Mandela’s era marked him in two ways. A tour of thanks and diplomatic goodwill to the many African nations that have supported South Africa’s long struggle for liberation, often at considerable cost. Helping other African countries end crises, such as the failed Mandela-brokered peace talks between Zaire’s dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and Rwandan-backed rebel leader Laurent Kabila, which I covered in 1997. was intended to
Both of these were political acts worthy of someone like Mandela, but the grand thank you tour diplomacy also included a widely overlooked strategic blunder. Mandela was humble and tried not to look like he was preaching on the political issues of other African countries. He was also careful never to play big brother, lest he come out as representative of a country far richer, more economically diverse and capable than most of the places he visited.
The appeal of this kind of humility is evident and consistent with Mandela’s overall grace. It also reflects a misunderstanding of the intertwined mechanics of geopolitical opportunity and power, resulting in significant lost opportunities for both South Africa and the region.
A better way for Mandela to express his gratitude for the support of his neighbors during apartheid would have been for South Africa to begin a massive program of deep economic integration with the region. South Africa has combined technology, economic development experience, ample funding and capable enterprises to roll out its own miniature Her Marshall Plan for Southern and Central Africa.
This would have included a massive increase in infrastructure construction to modernize and expand the road and rail networks. Not just the neighboring former British colony, but even the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). such as Angola and Mozambique. At the same time, South Africa will lead the construction of a huge integrated power generation system for the region, potentially ranking among the most powerful dams ever built on the Congo River, a long-dreamed dam. should have facilitated the construction of new hydrological dams. South African companies may also have spearheaded the expansion of the then-new cellular networks that were proliferating on the continent.
Some obvious objections arise, but they are not difficult to overcome. For one, although South Africa in the 1990s was rich on her per capita basis compared to its neighbors, it lacked the kind of wealth needed for such a business based solely on its own finances. I mean I didn’t have it. Another counter-argument is that South African corporations at the time still meant almost exclusively white South Africa, and that neighboring African countries were, until very recently, the pillars of their neighbors’ white power structures. There was little enthusiasm in allowing such access to new wealth. Poorly treated South African blacks may also have viewed this as an unacceptable gift to their former oppressors.
The last few years have amply shown that the best way to address South Africa’s most acute problems is to expand the proverbial cake of wealth and opportunity, rather than fighting over shrinking parcels. With political creativity and persistence, South Africa’s concerns about inadequate financial means and the potential for more of its advantages to be concentrated in the hands of a entrenched white elite could have unleashed powerful solutions. .
On the first score, Mandela should have invested more of his international prestige in pushing for international reparations and reconstruction funds across the region, attracting other African heads of state in this effort. The Mandela government dramatically increased employment, training, and promotion opportunities for black South Africans and contracted black-owned businesses to build new networks of physical infrastructure, power, and communications. , and even could have claimed a citizen’s stock position. In large companies that benefited from huge new opportunities in project work. Such efforts could have provided a sustained boost to national growth while significantly increasing regional prosperity.
What happened instead is instructive. Already by the early 2000s, it was becoming clear that if southern Africa were to become more integrated, this would come under the urge of the foreign power, China, rather than the local power of South Africa. This should not be seen as an indictment of a country that sought economic opportunities abroad to foster its continued growth and correctly recognized the vacuum in Southern Africa.
Nevertheless, South Africa’s failure to advance to the same opportunity has paid a price. By becoming a major network builder in the region, China has ensured that most of the profits go back to its own construction companies, manufacturers and suppliers. Western countries, which have a long history of supporting white rule in South Africa, have often accused China of looting in Africa. But the West itself has shown little political interest in helping Africa move forward economically, and has provided little financial support.
South Africa, on the other hand, is turning inward as economic conditions become more difficult. South African whites used to talk about the rest of Africa as if they were on another continent, and sadly this is now common among many South African blacks as well. Many black South Africans lash out at Africans from other countries coming to their land in search of jobs instead of trying to build new wealth and job opportunities far beyond their borders. I’m here.
This is all part of a larger tragedy that can be considered the “African Neighborhood Dilemma.” All African countries are held back to some extent by the poverty and weakness of their neighbors.
Nigeria is perhaps the best example of this. It is Africa’s demographic giant, but it also suffers from chronic poor governance and is a severely underperforming economy. A much more prosperous Nigeria would fundamentally improve the prospects for people across West Africa. Instead, economically, it’s little factor in their lives, but politically, the consequences of eventual failure or collapse must be considered in silence.
Conversely, even good economic news from countries such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire will always have limited impact on the welfare of the region as a whole, given their relative small size. The same is true for South Africa’s neighbors such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola.
However, this is no recipe for just sitting back and waiting to take action with many of the continent’s largest states in crisis or dysfunction. Few African leaders seem to understand, but the prospect of greater prosperity for the people of the continent depends on their countries building stronger economic ties with each other.
Some of South Africa’s dominance from the 1990s has been lost, but late is far better than never when it comes to taking the lead in regional integration.
